Insolvency of the Defendant as a Basis of Equity Jurisdiction by Ragland, Rawlings
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 21 | Issue 4 Article 7
1933
Insolvency of the Defendant as a Basis of Equity
Jurisdiction
Rawlings Ragland
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ragland, Rawlings (1933) "Insolvency of the Defendant as a Basis of Equity Jurisdiction," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 21 : Iss. 4 ,
Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol21/iss4/7
INSOLVENCY OF THE DEFENDANT AS A BASIS OF
EQUITY JURISDICTION*
The purpose of this note is to examine, in part, insolvency
as a basis for equitable jurisdiction. The question arises fre-
quently in both tort and contract cases. An examination of the
text-book writers and a general scanning of the cases will reveal
an apparently wide divergence both as to the rule on insolvency
as a jurisdictional fact and as to what should be the proper rule.
In the light of such a conflict, a more minute study of the cases
presenting the problem in its varied aspects is necessary The
cases themselves should present the status of the law on the point
and should afford a proper background for a decision as to what
should be the proper rule.
I. T EsrAss CASEs.
It has been stated that insolvency alone has been held suf-
ficient to give equity jurisdiction. Many text-book writers make
guch assertions and cite cases to uphold their contention.1 Dicta
in many cases indicates such a rule. However, an examination
of the cited cases show no instance of a single trespass plus in-
solvency in which equity gained jurisdiction. Many of the cases
cited do present, however, situations in which insolvency is an
important element and these cases are declared by some authori-
ties to uphold the contention that insolvency is a jurisdictional
fact. These cases are all similar in that the remedy at law, as a
practscal natter, appears adequate unless the insolvency of the
defendant makes the remedy inadequate. -
(1) In Pasges V Akrns,2 suit was brought to enjoin the
defendant from harvesting and removing a crop of summer-
fallow from the plaintiff's land. The insolvency of the defend-
ant was set out, The, court granted the injunction, stating-
"Absolute and complete insolvency need not be shown. The
*This is the first of a series of notes to be published under the
same general heading
:'Lawrence on Equity, Section 79. Pomeroy on Equity Jurispru-
dence, Section 1911.
2112 Cal. 401, 44 Pac. 666 (1896).
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granting of injunctions are to some extent matters of discretion,,
and should be exercised in favor of the party most likely to be.
injured."
In West v Smith,8 the plaintiff was in possession of public
land and plowed and sowed it. A bill for injunction to restrain
the defendant from harvesting the crop was allowed. The court
stated. "The plaintiff having alleged and proven that the title
to the standing grain was in himself and that the defendant is
insolvent, is entitled to an injunction to restrain the defendant
from harvesting and removing the crop" The standing crop
was here apparently considered as part of the realty and thus
the case is one of trespass in the nature of waste.
- In Amoskeay Manufacturing Company v ShIrley,4 the
plaintiff was granted an injunction to restrain the defendants.
from tearing down his flashboards. The defendants threatened
to do it again after having done such act once. The defendants.
were insolvent.
In Sooy Oyster Company v GaskilZ,5 the plaintiff was al-
lowed an injunction to restrain some fifty defendants from a
threatened raid upon the oyster beds owned by the plaintiff.
The insolvency of the defendants was alleged.
Admittedly, under the modern codes one suit at law could'
be brought to recover damages for such repeated trespasses over
a short, definite period of tne. Admittedly, the cases put
nearly all the emphasis ox the insolvency allegation. On the
other hand, most of the cases allowing injunction in such type of
case are old cases and it is entirely possible that separate suits
would be necessary But conceding that one law action would
be sufficient to cover all such trespasses, yet it does not neces-
sarily follow that insolvency in such cases is a jurisdictional
factor. Two explanations are possible
(a) All the cases present a situation in which repeated
trespasses are threatened. A party has a right to sue after each
trespass, thus equity may take jurisdiction to prevent a multi-
plicity of suits. The point has been presented in Gulf Compress
Company v Harru., Cortnr & Compay 6 thlajt. where a party
352 Cal. 322 (1877).
"69 N. H. 269, 39 Atl. 976 (1898).
3 69 Atlantic 1084 (1908).
648 So. (Ala.) 477 (1908)..
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may wait and recover all damage in an action at law that Equity
will force him to wait. The holding of the Gulf Compress Com-
pany case, supra, on tins point appears to be a minority view.
(b) Historically, equity had jurisdiction to enjoin all
threatened repeated trespasses. Recent decisions have shown a
tendency to limit the rule and not allow an injunction in all
cases of repeated trespasses.7 *Whenever a case presenting the
question of repeated trespasses is presented, the recent tendency
is to look to the facts, and see if as a practical matter the remedy
is adequate. Insolvency here does not give jurisdiction, but aids
the court in the use of its discretionary power of granting
injunctions after jurisdiction has been obtained. It is signifi-
cant that the courts invariably declare in this type of case that
'"the granting of injunctions is lergely a matter of discretion.
Insolvency aids the court in its decision", Hiccs v Compton,8
rather than that insolvency gives equity jurisdiction.
Thus the cases mentioned supra appear in theory correct
without regard to insolvency as a jurisdictional factor. The
cases indicate such a theoretical basis.
In the majority of cases in which the authorities call insolv-
ency the "make-weight", the remedy as a practical matter
would be adequate at law apart from the insolvency of the
defendant. Here, the courts again use repeated trespasses as
the pass-word to allow equity to take jurisdiction.
In Missour Pacific Railway Company v. Hobbs,9 the defend-
ant was restrained from selling his wares on the plaintiff's prop-
erty Apart from the defendant's insolvency, a law action
would admittedly restrain him. Yet the court in granting the
injunction stated. "Equity may restrain repeated trespassing
on another's property to avoid a multiplicity of suits, especially
where the defendant is insolvent."
In a similar case Wilson v Hill,10 the court declared that
they would grant an injunction to restrain an insolvent tres-
passer from threatened trespasses, but that if the trespasser had
'Hume v. Burns, 90 Pac. 1009 (1907), McIntyre v. McIntyre, 287
Ill. 544, 122 N. E. 824 (1919).
8 18 Cal. 206 (1861).
'13 S. W. (2d) 610 (1929).
20 46 N. J. Eq. 369, 19 Atl. 1094 (1890).
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been solvent, then the injunction would not have been granted.
Yet, the court indicated that insolvency alone was not sufficient
to give equity jurisdiction.
In a similar case Hicks v Compton,' the court declared-m
a case of threatened trespasses over an indefinite period. "The
granting of injunctions is largely a matter of discretion. In-
solvency aids the court m its decision"
In nearly all the "make-weight" cases, the courts stated
that apart from insolvency, the remedy at law was m fact ade-
quate, that insolvency caused the courts to allow the injunction
to be granted. But the courts, in order to guard against estab-
lishing insolvency as a jurisdictional factor practically all added
"insolvency alone is insufficient to give equity jurisdiction."
Those cases winch have overthrown the theoretical basis of
equitable jurisdiction as discussed supra have denied the equit-
able relief asked for on the ground that equity has no jurisdic-
tion to hear the matter. The cases present the situation of.
threatened trespasses by an insolvent trespasser where the
remedy at law is, in fact, adequate apart- from insolvency and
relief is denied.12
II. WASTE.
The courts have consistently held that equity has jurisdic-
tion to enjoin waste. Poeriner v Russell.1 3  Thus, in waste
cases there is no need to give any consideration to the possible
insolvency of the defendant Brsgham v Overstreet.1 4 The
reason for such a rule is clear as waste is injury to realty and
realty is unique.
The rule applied m waste cases is also applied m case of
trespass m the nature of waste. Mare v Messns.i5 "The tres-
pass is in the nature of waste, thus, the injury is irreparable m
itself" Rtchards v Dower 16
u18 Cal. 206 (1861).
"Mechanic's Foundry v. RyaUl, 75 Cal. 601, 17 Pac 703 (1888),
M3oore v. HaZliday, 72 Pac. 801 (1903), Hume v. Burns, 90 Pac. 1009
(1907), Dunkart v. Rinehart, 87 N. C. 224 (1882).
33 Wis. 193 (1873).
''128 Ga. 447, 57 S. E. 484 (1907)
25 32 Cal. 594.
1664 Cal. 62, 28 Pac. 113 (1883).
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III. SEERENCE OF NoN-UNIQuE CHATTELS.
(1) The case often arises where a tenant commits waste
which results in creatig non-unique chattels, severed from the
soil and lying around on the ground. The defendant is insolvent
and threatens to remove the chattel. The courts have consist-
ently held that an injunction will not be issued to restrain the
defendant from carrying off the chattel.1 7 Common law replevin
might not lie in such a situation, but clearly statutory replevm
is an adequate remedy apart from any question of insolvency
The cases clearly show that replevin will lie.is An analagous
situation arises where an insolvent trespasser threatens to carry
off non-unique personal property of the plaintiff. Replevmn
appears to be an adequate remedy apart from insolvency In
some cases where the tenant or trespasser is insolvent, the courts,
however, allow an injunction to restrain the removal of the chat-
tel.19 These courts do not contend that insolvency gives juris-
diction. For example, Spear v Cutter 20 states. "But where
the bill is filed to prevent future waste, and also to prevent the
removal of timber already cut, or for an accounting and satis-
faction for waste already committed, to avoid a multiplicity of
suits, the court will enjoin the defendant from removing the
timber already cut if the removal of the timber will cause irre-
parable injury Insolvency makes the injury irreparable."
Gray v. Malone2i likewise gives jurisdiction by showing the rela-
tion of the chattel with the previous waste or trespass in the
nature of waste.
CONTRACT CAsEs
In the consideration of insolvency as a jurisdictional factor
in contract cases, it must be noted in the first place that the
American Bankruptcy Act seeks to prevent any transfer by in-
solvent debtors on account of pre-existing obligation, by making
it an act of bankruptcy, and if bankruptcy supervenes within
W1 atson v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. 169 (1821), Simmons v. Williford,
60 Fla. 339, 53 So. 452 (1910).
IsMoNally v. Connolly, 70 Cal. 3, 11 Pac. 320 (1886), Warren
County, Supra v. Gans, 80 Miss. 76, 31 So. 693 (1901).
29Spear v. Cutter, 5 Barbour (N. Y.) 486 (1849), Gray v. Malone,
142 Ark. 609, 219 S. W 742 (1920), .Kaufman v. Wemner (1897), 169
Il1. 596, 48 N. E. 479.
"See Note 19.
SSee Note 19.
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four months, making the transaction voidable, if the creditors
had reasonable cause to believe that a preference would be
effected. Thus, the field in which insolvency could be a juris-
dictional matter is definitely limited at the present time.
The Bankruptcy Act does not apply to the sale of 'land
or unique chattel. Insolvency plays no part in the granting of
specific performance in such case, however, as equity will take
jurisdiction to compel specific performance merely because the
chattel is unique.
The query thus narrows down to this. will equity take juris-
diction to compel specific performance of a contract for non-
unique chattels because of the insolvency of the defendant'
In. Henry v Whidden22 the defendant breached a contract
for the sale of cattle to the plaintiff at a stated price. The de-
fendant was disposing of the cattle to a third party The
defendant was wholly execution proof and insolvent. The court
declared that no sufficient basis existed for equity jurisdiction.
The court in McLaughlin v. Piatti23 denied specific perform,
ance of a contract for the sale of cattle. In regard to the allega-
tion of the defendant's insolvency the court said "equity juris-
diction is not based on the accident of insolvency"
The court in Warren County v. Black Coal Company
24
stated. "The insolvency of the seller does not confer jurisdic-
tion on a court of equity to enforce a contract, the accident of
insolvency does not affect the question of jurisdiction"
The courts, however, do allow insolvency to be an important.
element when combined with other causes for equitable inter-
position.
(1) In Rtdenbaggh& v Thayer25 the petitioner made large
advances on a contract for the purchase of 2,500 cords of wood.
After partial performance, the defendant, insolvent, refused to
carry out the remainder of the contract. The court allowed
specific performance. The court stressed the insolvency of the
defendant, but apparently found a trust relation between the
parties.
. 48 Fla. 268, 37 So. 571 (1904).
=27 Cal. 452 (1865).
2185 West Va. 684, 102 S. E. 672 (1920).
10 Idaho 662, 80 Pgq, 229.
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(2) Clark v. Flint2V is frequently cited by writers holding.
that insolvency alone is sufficient. The court m allowing specific
performance said "A bill m equity may be maintained for the
specific performance of a written contract relating to personal
property, if the plaintiff has not an adequate remedy at law A
remedy by an action at law for damages against an insolvent
person is not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law".
It is undeniable, however, that recognized grounds for equitable
jurisdiction existed apart from insolvency as boats are unique, a
trust relation existed, and the complaint asked for an accounting.
In M'Namara v Home Land & Cattle Company,27 and
Chastsan v Smith,28 the courts apparently held that insolvency
gave jurisdiction.
In summary, it may be stated that an overwhelming major-
ity of the courts clearly hold that insolvency is not a jurisdic-
tional fact in contract cases, although it may be a controlling
factor in the court's decision as to the use of its discretionary
power. Apparently, a few cases declare that insolvency is a
jurisdictional factor, but such cases are rare. In both trespass
and contract cases, the courts speak loosely of insolvency when
jurisdictional factors are clearly present, but the courts clearly
declare that insolvency of itself -will not give jurisdiction when-
ever they render a decision which apparently allows insolvency
to give jurisdiction.
It reiiains only that brief attention be given to a view as to
what should be the rule. Equity should give relief where the
remedy at law is not adequate. When should the remedy at law
be considered adequate is the vital question.
One view is that "by inadequacy of the legal remedy is not
meant a failure to produce the money, but that in its nature or
character it is not fitted or adapted to the end n view" Duffy
Company v Lodebush.29 Any other view would "throw into
equity practically the entire field of tortious liability, as inade-
quacy of damages could be readily established n probably a
majority of the tort cases by the irresponsibility of the de-
fendant"
222 Pick (Mass.) 231 (1839).
21105 Fed. 202 (1860).
230 Ga. 96 (1860).
159 N. Y. S. 299, 173 App. Div. 205 (1916).
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Another view is that "the legal remedy must be as complete,
practical and efficient as that which equity could afford", Ter-
rance v. Thompson."0 If the defendant is insolvent "the legal
remedy is worse than bootless" Clark v Flint, Supra.
It is submitted that the insolvency cases present the view
that inadequacy of the remedy at law means that the remedy in
its nature or character is not adapted to the end in view, rather
than that the remedy fails to produce the money The great
majority of the cases show clearly grounds giving equity jurisdic-
tion apart from insolvency It is the rare case in which it may
even be argued that the remedy at law apart from insolvency is
adequate. The rarity of such cases, the lack of cases in which
insolvency is the only possible factor giving jurisdiction, and the
clarity with which the courts declare that insolvency of itself
will not give jurisdiction whenever they render a decision, which
apparently allows insolvency to give jurisdiction, indicates that
adequacy of legal remedy does not mean a production of the
money
As to whether the insolvency cases present the better view
as to adequacy of the remedy at law, there is serious doubt. It
is somewhat of an exaggeration to say that the result of any
other definition of adequacy would "at once throw into equity
practically the entire field of tortious liability, as inadequacy of
damages could be readily established in probably a majority of
tort cases by alleging and proving the irresponsibility of the
defendant" 31 Of course it, is not desirable to substitute specific
relief for damages as a normal relief. However, the modern
cases show a tendency to grant specific performance more freely
as a remedy in the place of damages. Such a result is desirable
to a limited extent. On this basis, the allowance of insolvency
as a make-weight is to be defended. The further extension of
specific performance as a remedy which would result from a
recognition of insolvency as giving jurisdiction is certainly not
a present reality, but would perhaps be wise from a practical
viewpoint. RAwJNGs RAGL-AND.
263 U. S. 197, 44 Supreme Ct. 15 (1923).
Walsh on Equity, page 318.
